



IMAC CONTROLLER O.S. v4.0, v4.1 & v4.2 SIL DECLARATION'S OF CONFORMITY

Integrated Monitoring and Control System

Introduction

In May 2018, the iMAC / iMAC2 Controller operating system firmware was modified to extend the iMAC Module Serial Number range.

These changes occurred in iMAC Controller Operating System Firmware v4.0 (O.S. v4.0).

Marcus Punch Pty Ltd was engaged to perform a safety integrity verification of these changes.

iMAC2 report AMP-15-01-A¹ Revision 3 (including Revisions 4 & 5) and iMAC report AMP-11-05-A² Revision 2 (including Revisions 3 & 4) assessed these changes to be in compliance with the requirements pertaining to software modification and as a result the existing safety metrics (PFD and PFH) for the iMAC Controller, iMAC2 Controller, 2-wire and 3-wire iMAC systems remain unchanged.

In August 2018, the iMAC / iMAC2 Controller operating system was modified to ensure iMAC Controller SLP command *NextForceAddr* maintains compatibility with the extended serial number range.

These changes occurred in iMAC Controller Operating System Firmware V4.1 (O.S. v4.1).

Marcus Punch Pty Ltd was engaged to perform a safety integrity verification of these changes.

iMAC2 report AMP-15-01-A³ Revision 6 and iMAC report AMP-11-05-A⁴ Revision 5 assessed these changes to be in compliance with the requirements pertaining to software modification and as a result the existing safety metrics (PFD and PFH) for the iMAC Controller, iMAC2 Controller, 2-wire and 3-wire iMAC systems remain unchanged.

In October 2020, the iMAC / iMAC2 Controller operating system was modified to improve priority scanning of fieldbus data.

These changes occurred in iMAC Controller Operating System Firmware V4.2 (O.S. v4.2).

Marcus Punch Pty Ltd was engaged to perform a safety integrity verification of these changes.

iMAC2 report AMP-15-01-A⁵ Revision 7 and iMAC report AMP-11-05-A⁶ Revision 6 assessed these changes to be in compliance with the requirements pertaining to software modification and as a result the existing safety metrics (PFD and PFH) for the iMAC Controller, iMAC2 Controller, 2-wire and 3-wire iMAC systems remain unchanged.

The prior SIL Declarations of Conformity for iMAC Controller, iMAC2 Controller, 2-wire and 3-wire iMAC systems have been revised only to the extent of referencing the latest revisions of these reports (the PFD and PFH safety metrics remain unchanged).

References and Disclaimer

- ¹AMP-15-01-A iMAC2 2-wire & 3-wire - SIL Verification Oct20 Rev5.pdf
- ²AMP-11-05-A iMAC 2-wire & 3-wire - SIL Verification May18 Rev4.pdf
- ³AMP-15-01-A iMAC2 2-wire & 3-wire - SIL Verification Aug18 Rev6.pdf
- ⁴AMP-11-05-A iMAC 2-wire & 3-wire - SIL Verification Aug18 Rev5.pdf
- ⁵AMP-15-01-A iMAC2 2-wire & 3-wire - SIL Verification Oct20 Rev7.pdf
- ⁶AMP-11-05-A iMAC 2-wire & 3-wire - SIL Verification Oct20 Rev6.pdf

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Marcus Punch Pty. Ltd.
Risk and Reliability


Declaration of Conformity (IMAC2_Controller_271020)

Marcus Punch Pty. Ltd. was engaged by Ampcontrol Group to perform a safety integrity verification on their iMAC Controller against the requirements of AS61508.2-2011. The verification was conducted according to the 'proven-in-use' and 'probabilistic' routes.

The details of the analyses and reviews that lead to these findings are provided in our report:

AMP-15-01-A Rev.7, iMAC2 Controller, EOL, MEOL and CRM 2-wire and 3-wire Systems Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 'Proven-In-Use' Verification - *Safety Integrity (SIL) Verification (dated 27th October 2020)*.

iMAC2 Controller (Part No's. 171571, 173552)		
Description	Finding	Conclusion
Hardware Safety Integrity Compliance Approach ¹	Route 1 _H	
Architectural Constraints	SFF=98.8%, HWFT=0, Type B	SIL2
Random Hardware Failures (Chi-square (χ^2) estimation at 90% degree of confidence)	$\lambda_{total} = 2.3 \times 10^{-5}$ / hour, or 23,000 FITS ² MTTF = 43,478 hours, or 5.0 years $\lambda_{du} = 2.8 \times 10^{-7}$ / hour, or 280 FITS MTTF _d = 3,571,429 hours, or 407.7 years	
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD _{ave})	PFD _{ave} = 1.3×10^{-3} (with proof-test interval = one (1) year) See below for PFD _{ave} V's proof-test interval.	SIL2
Probability of Dangerous Failure Per Hour (PFH)	PFH = 2.8×10^{-7}	SIL2
Systematic Safety Integrity (Systematic Capability) Compliance Approach ³	Route 2 _s	
Systematic Capability ⁴	SC2	
Overall SIL Capability ⁵	SIL2	



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¹ Per AS61508.2-2011 Clauses 7.4.2 and 7.4.4.

² 1 FIT = 1 failure per billion hours, or a failure rate of 1×10^{-9} / hour.

³ Per AS61508.2-2011 Clauses 7.4.2 and 7.4.4.

⁴ Per AS61508.2-2011 Clause 7.4.3.

⁵ Overall SIL capability is determined by the minimum SIL indicated by the above parameters.

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
Declaration of Conformity (IMAC2_System_2&3W_271020)

Marcus Punch Pty. Ltd. was engaged by Ampcontrol Group to perform a safety integrity verification on their iMAC 2-wire and 3-wire System configurations against the requirements of AS61508.2-2011. The verification was conducted according to the 'proven-in-use' and 'probabilistic' routes.

The details of the analyses and reviews that lead to these findings are provided in our report:

AMP-15-01-A Rev.7, iMAC2 Controller, EOL, MEOL and CRM 2-wire and 3-wire Systems Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 'Proven-In-Use' Verification - *Safety Integrity (SIL) Verification (dated 27th October 2020)*.

iMAC2 2-wire & 3-wire Systems (Part No's. 171571, 173552)		
Description	Finding	Conclusion
Hardware Safety Integrity Compliance Approach ¹	Route 1 _H & 2 _H	
Architectural Constraints	2&3-wire with-out CRM: SFF>90%, HWFT=0, Type B 2&3-wire with CRM: SFF>90%, HWFT=1, Type B	SIL2 SIL3
Random Hardware Failures (Chi-square (χ^2) estimation at 90% degree of confidence)	2&3-wire with-out CRM: $\lambda_{du} = 2.9 \times 10^{-7}$ / hour, or 290 FITS 2&3-wire with CRM: $\lambda_{du} = 2.1 \times 10^{-8}$ / hour, or 21 FITS	
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD _{ave})	2&3-wire with-out CRM: PFD _{ave} = 1.3×10^{-3} 2&3-wire with CRM: PFD _{ave} = 9.1×10^{-5} (with proof-test interval = one (1) year) See below for PFD _{ave} V's proof-test interval.	SIL2 SIL4
Probability of Dangerous Failure Per Hour (PFH)	2&3-wire with-out CRM: PFH = 2.9×10^{-7} 2&3-wire with CRM: PFH = 2.1×10^{-8}	SIL2 SIL3
Systematic Safety Integrity (Systematic Capability) Compliance Approach ²	Route 2 _s	
Systematic Capability ³	SC2	
Overall SIL Capability ⁴	2&3-wire with-out CRM: SIL2 2&3-wire with CRM: SIL3	



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
Declaration of Conformity (IMAC_Controller_271020)

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The details of the analyses and reviews that lead to these findings are provided in our report:

AMP-11-05-A Rev.6, iMAC Controller, EOL, MEOL and CRM 2-wire and 3-wire Systems Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 'Proven-In-Use' Verification - *Safety Integrity Verifications (SIL) Proven-In-Use Verification (dated 27th October 2020).*

iMAC Controller (Part No's. 101268, 112583, 118532, 118709, 118710, 120964)		
Description	Finding	Conclusion
Hardware Safety Integrity Compliance Approach ¹	Route 2 _H	
Architectural Constraints	SFF=96.5%, HWFT=0, Type B	SIL2
Random Hardware Failures (Chi-square (χ^2) estimation at 90% degree of confidence)	$\lambda_{total} = 5.8 \times 10^{-6}$ / hour, or 5800 FITS ² MTTF = 171,524 hours, or 19.6 years $\lambda_{du} = 2.5 \times 10^{-7}$ / hour, or 250 FITS MTTF _d = 4,000,000 hours, or 457 years	
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD _{ave})	PFD _{ave} = 1.1×10^{-3} (with proof-test interval = one (1) year) See below for PFD _{ave} V's proof-test interval.	SIL2
Probability of Dangerous Failure Per Hour (PFH)	PFH = 2.5×10^{-7}	SIL2
Systematic Safety Integrity (Systematic Capability) Compliance Approach ³	Route 2 _s	
Systematic Capability ⁴	SC2	
Overall SIL Capability ⁵	SIL2	



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² 1 FIT = 1 failure per billion hours, or a failure rate of 1×10^{-9} / hour.

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
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iMAC 2-wire & 3-wire Systems (Part No's. 101268, 112583, 118532, 118709, 118710, 120964)		
Description	Finding	Conclusion
Hardware Safety Integrity Compliance Approach ¹	Route 2 _H	
Architectural Constraints	2&3-wire with-out CRM: SFF>90%, HWFT=0, Type B 2&3-wire with CRM: SFF>90%, HWFT=1, Type B	SIL2 SIL3
Random Hardware Failures (Chi-square (χ^2) estimation at 90% degree of confidence)	2&3-wire with-out CRM: $\lambda_{du} = 2.6 \times 10^{-7}$ / hour, or 260 FITS 2&3-wire with CRM: $\lambda_{du} = 1.9 \times 10^{-8}$ / hour, or 19 FITS	
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD _{ave})	2&3-wire with-out CRM: PFD _{ave} = 1.2×10^{-3} 2&3-wire with CRM: PFD _{ave} = 8.5×10^{-5} (with proof-test interval = one (1) year) See below for PFD _{ave} V's proof-test interval.	SIL2 SIL4
Probability of Dangerous Failure Per Hour (PFH)	2&3-wire with-out CRM: PFH = 2.6×10^{-7} 2&3-wire with CRM: PFH = 1.9×10^{-8}	SIL2 SIL3
Systematic Safety Integrity (Systematic Capability) Compliance Approach ²	Route 2 _s	
Systematic Capability ³	SC2	
Overall SIL Capability ⁴	2&3-wire with-out CRM: SIL2 2&3-wire with CRM: SIL3	



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